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Executive Summary  
 
The present report on diversity explores the selected ethnic and religious minorities in Poland 
and the attitude of the majority of the Polish society towards still relatively few immigrants. 
First part focuses on the process of the formation of the Polish national identity and the main 
cultural diversity challenges in the last two decades, while the second aims at outlining the 
general attitude of the majority towards the cultural minorities on the two examples of Tatars 
and Roma; it also examines the common understanding of the concept of tolerance, cultural 
diversity, and practicing/ implementing the idea of multiculturalism. 
Polish understanding of multiculturalism differs significantly from that in other European 
countries, as it is mainly based on historical memory, referring to the period of Noble’s 
democracy and the political practice of the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania in 16th-
17th century. Actions supporting cultural diversity in society which is recognized as one of 
the most ethnically homogeneous in the world, are based mainly on the popularization of folk 
performances and celebration of the exotic cultural attractions, with virtually no discussion on 
changes in the ethnic composition of the Polish society (arising with the waves of incoming 
immigrants, especially from the East) and the marginalization of ethnic/cultural minorities’ 
presence in public space and social awareness. The growing standard of living and Polish 
membership in the EU makes Poland more attractive for immigrants from the so called Third 
Countries, which does not affect real situation of immigrants’ functioning within the Polish 
state, even though there are many efforts made by various authorities towards legislative 
changes in the spirit of the guidelines imposed on Poland by the European Union. 
The country, reborn after partitions and WWI, already professed an ethnic concept of 
nationalism. WWII strengthened the images of unavoidable ethnic conflict and communist 
Poland was created as a mono-ethnic society. Intricate post-war history was marked by 
homogenising attempts accepted by the majority of the dominant population. The democratic 
changes which took place after 1989 made the country tolerant in the form we call 
‘constitutional nationalism’. It entails the acceptance of other, provided that the titular nation 
sets the rules of this coexistence. The acceptance of democratic principles demanded by 
international institution, means that legally all standards of liberal societies are met, but it 
does not mean that the practice is acceptable. 
Political liberalisation has prompted the ‘coming out’ of minorities. Before the National 
Census of 2002, experts estimated the total number of indigenous ethnic minorities in Poland  
between 2 and 4% of the total population. The Census showed that only 471 500 (1.23%) of 
respondents declared an ethnicity other than Polish. The low numbers are interpreted as a 
heritage of the reluctance of people to show their ethnic identity in the mono-ethnic state and 
to reinforce a sense of marginality of all matters relating to the functioning of minorities in 
society shared by the majority of Poles. 
According to the definition introduced in the Act of 2005, there are nine national minorities 
recognised in Poland: Belarussians (48 000), Czechs (386), Lithuanians (5 846), Germans 
(152 897), Armenians (1 082), Russians (6 103), Slovaks (2 001), Ukrainians (30 957) and 
Jews (1 133). Polish law also acknowledges four ethnic minorities substantiated historically: 
Roma (12 855), Tatars (495), Lemkos (5 863) and Karaims (43). A special category of 
‘regional languages’ was added and two such linguistic minorities are recognized, i.e. 
Kashubians  (5 063) and Silesians (173 153). So far, Silesians has not been recognized by the 
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Polish state as an ethnic minority, while being the biggest subjectively chosen identity 
(170 000 people). 
Estimated number of immigrants in Poland constitutes less than one percent of the total 
population (app. 380 000 people). The issue of immigrants is relatively new and complex 
problem in Poland. Since the early nineties of the twentieth century Poland, which has been a 
traditional ‘migrant sending’ country for a few generations, became a destination and transit 
country. The presence of foreigners, majority of whom come from the former Soviet Union, 
constitutes a new challenge, but also a complex dilemma for Polish policy and Poles’ attitudes 
towards migration. Foreigners mostly choose big cities for their place of residence, especially 
the capital. Percentage of permanent immigrants is still low, and immigrant’s legal status is 
relatively difficult to achieve. Illegal migrants have problems with their integration in many 
spheres of life, including the job market, education and health systems. 
The report studies Roma and Muslims – two groups that can be described as dramatically 
different in Polish cultural conditions. The first, perceived as stereotypical social outcasts, has 
been discriminated for ages, the second has re-appeared in social consciousness under a new 
guise of an Islamic threat, abstract in the Polish context. These cases vividly illustrate the key 
features of the discourse on cultural diversity and the practices designed to cope with the 
diversity that has re-appeared in Poland after fifty years of absence. 
Roma are a recognized ethnic minority, which had experienced violent assimilationist 
activities of the communist state in the post-war period and which remains the most socially 
marginalized minority group in Poland, despite the attempts aimed at their integration with 
Polish society, especially when it comes to education of Romani children and fighting 
negative image of the group. However, conflicts occurring in  local communities inhabited by 
Roma show little effectiveness of integration policies and the attitude (based on perceived 
cultural strangeness) of Poles towards the Roma constantly remains largely negative. 
Another example of diversity challenge is Muslim community in Poland. Muslims face 
discrimination on the grounds of xenophobia, which may be called ‘phantom islamophobia’. 
This phenomenon derives from the same source in which some Polish contemporary anti-
Semitic resentments are rooted. In Poland, both Jews and Muslims/Arabs are very few in 
number, yet they function as ‘imagined communities’ that threaten national and religious 
interests or nation’s integrity. Despite very small population (app. 30 000 people), Muslims 
serve as an example of a group raising high social fear and concern, endowed with a strong 
negative stereotype comparable to the prejudices against Roma, arising from assumed 
unbridgeable differences in religion, basic values and lifestyle, perceived also as an 
insurmountable obstacles on the way to integration. Muslims coming to Poland in the last 
three decades are contrasted with Tatars – Muslim community living in Polish territory for 
centuries – a group considered to be familiar because of common cultural practices shared 
with the Polish majority, an exemplary case that illustrates the way in which acceptance can 
be gained, i.e. based on partial assimilation and modesty in declarations or practices, as well 
as “refraining from radical otherness” in the public sphere. 
In 1989, the new authorities declared the will to break with the communist assimilationist 
policy and grant every citizen civic rights secured by international conventions. They also 
wanted to change Pole’s attitudes towards minorities and redefine the state – minority 
relations, aiming both at their integration and active participation in public life. In everyday 
practice, though, state legislation is not always efficiently implemented at the local level, and 
raises conflicts over the allocation of public funds. Official statements clash with popular 
images and social awareness of minorities’ presence and rights.  
The discourse on tolerance in a modern sense of the word is relatively recent in Poland. As 
such, it is absent in mainstream education, and seen as redundant from the point of view of 
Michał Buchowski and Katarzyna Chlewińska 
4 
the majority. One can associate its potential growth of importance for the ordinary people and 
for policy makers only in relation to the growing immigration and expanding activism of 
other social minorities, such as sexual minorities or physically challenged people. 
Cultural/ethnic minority rights in the fields of education and the cultivation of culture do not 
raise objections. In this respect attitudes are fully tolerant and can probably be connected to 
the long-lasting ‘folklorisation’ of diversity, and be partly congruent with multiculturalist 
ideas. Actual problems appear when state or EU funding for cultural activities come into play 
and when the issues of bilingualism in regions populated by minorities (e.g. street names), 
political representation and commemorations of historical events in the public are considered. 
Poles eagerly accept ‘strangeness’ and ‘otherness’, provided that it is practiced in the private 
sphere or as an exotic custom, i.e. it implies activities that do not interfere with their image of 
the world and do not jeopardize the idea of a homogenous community and a sense of security 
based on cultural familiarity. 
The level of respect for the rights of minorities is improving, legal standards are increasingly 
congruent with both the social reality and international instruments for equality and anti-
discrimination. Despite these improvements, data on insufficient state action in many areas 
concerning support granted to culturally distinct groups appear repeatedly, particularly in 
relation to immigrants. Public opinion polls indicate that the reluctance of Poles towards 
people of different nationalities and ethnic backgrounds residing in Poland is slowly 
decreasing, which can be treated as one of the premises indicating that the tolerance of 
cultural diversity in Poland is growing. This is of great importance in the face of the influx of 
immigrants, from Asia to Eastern Europe, among others. 
The contemporary debate on tolerance in Poland refers constantly to the mythical tolerance of 
the Nobles’ Republic, resulting in little social conscience on the real problems of minority 
groups and in a reluctance to revise traditional views. This situation is reinforced by the 
relatively low numbers of minority and immigrant populations, together with a still overriding 
importance of the ethnic and cultural component in the common representation of the 
nation/community. As the number of culturally distinct citizens within the Polish society 
increases, it can be expected that changes in attitudes towards every-day contact with different 
cultural practices will evolve, thus changes in educational programs and public education 
campaigns are necessary in order to alter the social disposition towards cultural diversity. 
 
Keywords: history of Polish tolerance, constitutional nationalism, ethnic minorities, religious    
minorities, Roma, Muslims, Tatars, tolerance, Poland 
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1. Introduction  
 
Poland is one of the less diversified societies on the globe. Walter Connor reported that in 
1971 that among 138 countries taken into account only 12, i.e. 9.1 per cent could be 
considered ‘national’, Poland included (1994: 96). The historical Commonwealth of Poland 
and Lithuania (14
th
 to 18
th
 centuries) was in itself diverse linguistically, ethnically and 
religiously, and it also welcomed various ethnic and religious minorities. In this respect, it 
was a very tolerant regime in a sea o mostly intolerant European countries (e.g., already in the 
13
th
 century Polish kings allowed Jews, who were expelled from western countries,  to settle 
and practice their faith). One could say that at that time it represented a case of an ‘imperial 
regime of tolerance’ (Walzer 1999), in which various self-governed collectives were allowed  
to observe their religious practices, provided they did not proselytise (similarly to millets in 
the Ottoman Empire). Still, when the republic was reborn after WWI, religious and ethnic 
minorities comprised almost one third of the population. Only after WWII, due to the 
Holocaust, border changes, and ‘population exchanges’ with the defeated Germany and 
victorious Soviet Union, the country was made practically homogenous ethnically (Poles) and 
religiously (Roman-Catholics). Actually, having a homogenous population was an official 
aim of the communist authorities and it was exercised throughout their reign. 
 
The last thirty years may be divided into three periods: the continuation of the systematically 
liberalized communist rule, democratic change after 1989 till the EU accession in May 2004, 
and the last five years, as soon after Poland's accession to the EU a new law on national, 
ethnic and linguistic minorities was accepted and put into practice. Although, the 1952 
Communist constitution granted non-discrimination, ‘nationalities’ (not ‘ethnic minorities’) 
were barely mentioned in it (Łodziński 2010: 21). In practice, minorities could barely 
cultivate their traditions through the channels of state-controlled ‘cultural associations’. 
Ethnic issues perceived as threatening to the state interest were downplayed and  hidden from 
the public. ‘Solidarity’ was concerned with economic and political problems and the issues of 
minorities were raised only incidentally. In the process of post-1989 democratic changes 
minorities were allowed to form associations and express their opinions. Besides the internal 
will to democratise the political order, integration with the EU and its institutions also pushed 
policy makers to accept liberal laws concerning religious freedoms as well as ethnic and 
national minorities. 
 
Polish multiculturalism is different from that of multiethnic or immigrant societies, such as 
Switzerland or the UK. Although lip service is paid to multicultural traditions, it is seen as a 
historical phenomenon. For instance, ‘multicultural’ festivals are organised in big cities, small 
towns and in borderland regions (cf. Bieniecki 2004), but virtually all of them refer to past  
‘multiethnic’ or religiously diversified life. Multiculturalism is also mentioned in the media 
and some official statements. Tolerance is evoked as an old Polish historical tradition. Today, 
‘tolerance and multiculturalism’ serve rather as a myth that legitimises current politics than  
actual administrative and political practice. But this ethnic homogenisation of the society 
makes issues of the acceptance of, and tolerance toward ‘others’ even more urgent, e.g. with 
respect to how, in such an ethnically uniform society, ethnic and religious minorities 
perceived as marginal are treated. Simultaneously, the growing standard of living and 
membership in the EU makes Poland more attractive for immigrants from the so called third 
countries. This gives an opportunity to observe reactions to these ‘growing social problems’, 
as they are often bluntly described, and to interpret them in terms of  ‘a culture of tolerance’. 
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This report on the one hand gives basic data about the national, ethnic and religious minorities 
in Poland in a historical perspective, as well as basic information about increasing migration. 
On the other hand, it describes some legal regulations regarding ethnic and religious 
minorities. These rules meet European Union and other international standards, but also bear 
traces of a local political thought which reflects the state of mind of the political elites, 
usually legitimized by historical and cultural circumstances.  
 
2. National identity and state formation 
 
The Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania (15th-18
th
 centuries) was a noble’s democracy. 
The nobility (szlachta) had many privileges similar to modern democracies. The political 
system entailed, among others, free election of the king by all nobles wishing to participate; 
sessions of the parliament, Sejm, held at least every other year; pacta conventa, agreements 
bargained with the king-elect; the right of insurrection against a king who violated liberties; 
liberum veto, a right of the local councils’ sejmiks’ representatives to oppose any new law 
accepted; and confederation –  the right to organise rebellion through a collective political 
purpose. 
 
The system granted a federative character of the Commonwealth with a great autonomy of the 
regions and political rights to szlachta that comprised 10% of the population. (In 1831 in 
France only 1% of the population had voting rights, and in 1867 in the United Kingdom – 
3%.) All szlachta had equal rights, could not be arrested without court sentence, etc. The 
Commonwealth was called paradiso hereticorum. Already in 1264, the General Charter of 
Jewish Liberties guaranteed safety, personal liberties, freedom of religion, trade and travel to 
Jews in Poland, exclusive jurisdiction over Jewish matters to Jewish judges, and it also 
instituted a special court for settling conflicts between Jews and Christians. 
 
This act encouraged Jews to settle in Polin, a historical homeland of three quarters of today’s 
world Jewry. Another act is known as the Warsaw Confederation, in which delegates of 
various denominations guaranteed tolerance and reciprocal cooperation. It confirmed that 
people of various ethnic backgrounds (Poles, Lithuanians, Ruthenians, Germans, Tatars, 
Vlachs, Scots, Dutch, etc.) and ethnic denominations (Roman-Catholic, Jewish, various 
Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, Greco-Catholic [Uniates] and Muslim) lived together. 
 
This law expressed the noble’s will to avoid religious conflicts such as the Thirty Years War 
in Europe. In result, the country's peaceful religious life was something exceptional. The 
Commonwealth became a place where even extreme religious groups like the Mennonites, 
Moravians and Arians found refuge (cf. Davies 1982, I). These historical traditions are 
evoked in discourses on tolerance today. For some, this supposedly makes Poland a naturally 
tolerant country. 
 
The nobility described itself as a ‘nation’ that was ‘racially’ different from burghers, Jews  
and peasants  (cf. Hertz 1988).  Nevertheless, this noble’s notion of nation gave rise to its 
more modern concept. According to Andrzej Walicki (1994), before the three consequent 
partitions of the country in 1772, 1793 and 1795, the Commonwealth’s society was on the 
way to a civic form of nationalism, similar to the French model. Enlightenment intellectuals 
explicitly advocated Polish citizenship, regardless of language, religion or class origin. The 
Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Poland 
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‘polonisation’ of elites was also a spontaneous process that was lasted for centuries. It is best 
illustrated by the first words of the national Polish epos from the beginning of the 19
th
 
century, Pan Thaddues, written in Polish by Adam Mickiewicz (himself born to a petite noble 
family, but whose mother came from a converted Jewish family, in Nowogródek, then 
Lithuania, now Belarus): “Lithuania, my homeland…” 
 
The interruption of state existence, the rise of ethnic nationalism in (Central) Europe, and the 
nationalising policies of Prussia and Russia all caused the transformation of Polish 
nationalism from civic to ethnic In the second part of the 19
th
 century the issue of class 
composition of a nation understood in terms of ethnicity became urgent,  especially that 
peasants did not always sympathise with the subsequent noble’s uprisings. The task of 
intellectuals was to  get the peasantry involved in the national cause (cf. Stauter-Halstead 
2001), nation being defined ethnically. This is why the concept of a state of three major 
autonomous groups (Poles, Ukrainians and Belarussians) advocated by fighter for 
sovereignty, Marshall Józef Piłsudski, failed and the nationalist idea of Roman Dmowski took 
an upper hand after WWI. 
 
After regaining independence in 1918 the country was designed as a democratic republic in 
which all citizens were equal under law, independently of religious, class or ethnic affiliation. 
The Wilsonian plan of building a nation state securing minority rights was accepted, but not 
really implemented. In the interwar nationalist milieu, Polish authorities carried out a 
nationalizing policy. The Nazi Germany invasion on September 1, 1939, motivated by racial-
nationalist concepts, exacerbated chauvinistic feelings also in the oppressed populations. Post-
WWII communist authorities embraced nationalist ideology and opted for an ethnically 
homogenous state-model. In the former German territories, which were a partial 
compensation for the territorial loss to the Soviet Union, Germans were expelled and Poles 
replaced them. After the Potsdam agreement, 3.2 million Germans were driven out of the new 
Polish territories (Sakson 2010: 11).  
 
Processes of de-germanisation and re-polonisation were carried out in the second half of the 
1940s (Kulczycki 2001; Linek 2001). According to some estimations, ca. 2 million 
‘autochthons’ were ‘rehabilitated and ‘incarcerated’ in Poland (Kamusella 2003: 18). 
Ukrainian military resistance in south-eastern Poland (1945-47) was suppressed and led to the 
eviction of ca. 100 000 Ukrainians and Lemkos (an ethnic minority, mostly Orthodox) from 
regions on the border with Ukraine and Slovakia, and their dispersion across Poland, 
especially in the former German territories (cf. Hann 1996).  
 
The model of a monolithic ethnic state was supported by Poles who experienced  German 
persecutions and were convinced that ethno-religious uniformity secures peace. In the 1947 
referendum (even though carried out in the atmosphere of fear), virtually all political forces, 
(Kersten 1989: 462) opted for the acquisition of German lands. As Krystyna Kersten 
summarizes: “War, by sharpening and drawing out national divisions, shaped a specifically 
Polish national consciousness. In a situation of danger, the nation emerged as a dominant 
category and major subject of actions... [N]ational divisions and distinctions that partly 
resulted from self-identification, but mostly imposed from the outside, above all by Germans, 
instead of disappearing after the war, had been strengthened” (1993: 11). 
 
The consolidation of power by the communists enabled them to launch a formally tolerant 
policy towards nearly non-existent national minorities; this course of action, despite 
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fluctuating periods of tightening and loosening of the policy1, was exercised for the next four 
decades. Ethnic and religious minorities were recognised and had their cultural associations. 
However, the state presented itself as an ideological, social and cultural monolith. Individual 
freedoms were granted in the constitution passed in 1952, but minorities could barely 
cultivate their traditions through the channels of cultural associations controlled by the state. 
 
State sponsored and organised ‘multiculturalism’ can be described as ‘folklorist’. Any serious 
ethnic issues, perceived as threatening to the state’s interest, e.g. the existence of the German 
minority and the waves of migration to Western Germany (1945-8, 1956, 1970s, 1980s), were 
concealed, and problems were only incidentally made known to the public – usually when a 
group was blamed by propaganda for some wrongdoings.  
 
In this period of ‘normalisation’ authorities started to ‘solve’ the Gypsy issue. A paternalistic 
and assimilationist decree from 1952 as well as an oppressive policy between 1960 and 1964 
obliged them to stop nomadism and  to have a job (unemployment was not tolerated under 
communism and the jobless were called “blue birds”). The Roma had to convert from an 
unproductive ‘waste’ to a ‘productive force’ (Mirga 1998: 125-140; Bartosz 1994). This 
regulation found full support of the population, who considered the Roma people parasites.  
 
In 1968, the communists launched an anti-Semitic campaign. 300 000 Jews had survived the 
Holocaust, and many of them left Poland later, especially frightened by the pogrom in Kielce 
in 1946 (Nowak-Małolepsza 2010: 215). Internal Party struggles, anti-Israeli politics of the 
Soviet Union and students’ protests incited the anti-Zionist campaign and the cleansing of 
Jews from top ranks in the state apparatus and higher education. This operation was based on 
anti-Semitic sentiments and it received partial support of the population. It drove ca. fifteen 
thousand  Polish Jews and their in-laws out of the country, many of them top intellectuals (cf. 
Eisler 2006). Today, no more than 10 000 Jews live in Poland. 
 
The ‘Solidarity’ movement of 1980-81 was concerned above all with the liberalisation of the 
system and economic issues (the first goal was partly fulfilled by the radio broadcasting of a 
Catholic Sunday Mass was in fact the only promise in the agreement between the protesting 
workers and the authorities from August 1980 that the communist kept after crushing the 
movement till the end of their rule in 1989) and the question of minority rights was not really 
raised by it (Szczepański 2008). Poland entered the 1990s as a country homogenised 
ethnically and religiously with minority issues barely existent due to their size and the 
communists’ tactics of sweeping most problems under the carpet and playing the ethnic card 
only in order to stir hatred that served their own political purposes. Minorities were hardly 
perceptible in everyday life. 
 
 In the process of democratic change they were allowed to form associations and express their 
opinions. The 1991 Treaty with Germany gave political rights to Germans who have self-
organised in various associations, membership in which had risen to hundreds of thousands (it 
is estimated between one to three hundred thousand). Moreover, this minority, thanks to a 
special election law, has since then had representatives in the parliament. Besides, the will to 
                                                     
1
  Sławomir Łodziński distinguishes five such periods: 1) verification of nationalities (1945-470; 2) 
gradual recognition of some minorities (1948-55); 3) emigration of Germans and improvement of relations 
between the State and minorities (1956-1968); 4) anti-Semitic campaign in 1968 followed by the policy of 
‘moral-political unity of the Polish nation’ (1968-1980); 5) period of intensified minorities’ activity initiated by 
‘Solidarity’ and relaxation of the authorities' attitude towards them (2010: 18-20). 
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democratise the political order after decades of authoritarianism as well as the integration of 
the country with EU institutions has encouraged the acceptance of liberal laws concerning the 
freedoms of religious and ethnic minorities. 
 
Meanwhile, the Catholic Church had emerged from the communist era as a chaperon of the 
nation’s interest. Persecuted in the 1950s and 1960s, it assumed the role of the nation’s 
representative before the authorities in the 1970s and 1980s. The Church facilitated the Round 
Table talks in 1989 which led to the first semi-free elections, which in turn sparked the 
democratisation of Eastern Europe. Empowered, the episcopate bargained for privileges. 
Today, for instance, the state supports religious education in public schools for those who 
wish to attend – in practice, due to social pressure, virtually all. The Church has also become 
a beneficiary of property restitution which was not granted to most other groups. It also 
engaged in discussions about the new constitution of the state. The Basic Law accepted in 
1997 aptly epitomises the legal order of the state and a nuanced nature of the ‘Polish state of 
the mind’ pertinent for tolerance. 
 
The preamble to the Constitution also states the following: 
 
“Having regard for the existence and future of our Homeland, 
Which recovered, in 1989, the possibility of a sovereign and democratic determination of its fate, 
We, the Polish Nation – all citizens of the Republic, 
Both those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty, 
As well as those not sharing such faith but respecting those universal values as arising from other sources, 
Equal in rights and obligations towards the common good – Poland...” (emphases added). 
 
The Constitution is a compromise between the advocates of the ethnic and the civil concepts 
of the nation (Zubrzycki 2001; Brier 2006). In that sense, we are back at a discussion between 
the ‘French’ and ‘German’ models. The last sentence cited grants the equality of all citizens. 
However, the Polish nation and believers in god  function as a non-marked category in 
relation to which others, i.e. non-Poles and non-believers, are presented as a supplementary 
category. After Robert Hayden (2001: 15), and contrary to most Polish scholars (cf. Łodziński 
2010: 27), we call this kind of arrangement which introduces inequality between people 
‘constitutional nationalism’. The titular nation and its collective rights as well as dominant 
world view holders are given precedence over other citizens. This Herderian heritage is 
prevalent in the whole region and Poland is not unique in this respect (cf. Buchowski 2008: 
32-35). By analogy we can also call this arrangement ‘constitutional monotheism’ (implicitly: 
‘Christianity / Catholicism’). 
 
The special treatment of Poles living abroad, which is secured by the so-called ‘Polish card’, 
similar to the Hungarian one, proves how significant ius sanguinis remains. Recently, a public 
initiative aimed at the facilitation of  the ‘repatriation’ of Poles from the former Soviet Union 
and signed by 215 thousands persons, was submitted to the parliament2.  The existing 
constitutional solution should be seen as an expression of a nationalistically-minded 
population that had to meet the liberal standards of European democracies. 
 
                                                     
2
 http://www.repatriacja.org.pl/ 
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Integration with the EU has intensified two contradictory discourses: 1) Europe as a chance 
for modernisation and pluralisation of the nation, and 2) European integration as a threat to 
the national and moral integrity of the nation. 
 
All discussions about tolerance in contemporary Poland seem to revolve around the issue of 
who is the real host and who is the tolerated minority or migrant in the country of the Polish 
nation, and  the slogan Poland for Poles, used by extremist nationalists is not that unpopular.  
 
 
3. Main cultural diversity challenges in Poland 
 
3.1. Minorities in the post-1989 period 
 
As mentioned above, interwar Poland was a multiethnic state. According to the 1931 census, 
in a total population of 32.107 million people, 69% were ethnic Poles, 14% were Ukrainians, 
9% were Jews, 5% were Belarussians , 2%  were Germans , and 1% were other ethnic 
minorities (Tartars, Karaims, Russians, etc.)  (Tomaszewski 1985: 50). The country was also 
divided religiously: Roman Catholics – 64.8%, Greek-Catholics (Uniates) – 10.5%, Orthodox 
– 11.8%, Protestants – 2.6%, Jews – 9.8% and others – 0.5%. In result of the processes 
described above, the public embraced the policy of a national state exercised by the 
communist authority. In result, in the 2002 census, out of 38 230 88 people, 36 983 720 
declared Polish nationality (96.74%). 
 
After 1989, the Polish democratic government recognised the distinct ethnic and cultural 
groups. The state protects individual citizens independently of their national identification 
which is a matter of personal choice (Łodziński 2005: 160-168). The current Constitution has 
several articles which are relevant to ethnic and national minorities: (1) article 13 is a 
commitment to political pluralism, and forbids parties that endorse race or national hatred;  
(2) article 32 bans any form of discrimination and declares the equality of any individual 
before the law; (3) article 35 affirms the right of members of national minorities to preserve 
and develop their culture, traditions, religion and language, and to found institutions to realise 
this right; (4) article 53 guarantees the freedom of religion to all and allows religion to be 
taught in schools provided that  the freedom of religion of others is not endangered; (5) article 
25 affirms the equality of churches and religious organisations (Fleming 2002: 534-535). 
However, ‘tolerance’ as an idea cannot be found in the basic law (Pawełkowski 2009: 199). 
 
Political liberalisation has prompted the ‘coming out’ of minorities. Before the National 
Census of 2002, experts estimated the total number of indigenous ethnic minorities in Poland  
between 800 000 and 1 600 000, i.e. between 2 and 4% of the total population. To the 
bewilderment of the scholars and minority activists, the Census showed that only 471 500 
(1.23%) of respondents declared an ethnicity other than Polish. The low numbers are 
interpreted as a heritage of the reluctance of people to show their ethnic identity in the mono-
ethnic state (cf. Cordell & Dybczyński 2005: 80-82) or as manipulations of interviewers who 
refused listing nationalities other than Polish (cf. Dolińska 2010: 350-52). Moreover, 774 855 
persons (2.03%) did not declare any nationality, and 4 277 are listed under the category of 
‘Polish-undetermined’, polska-nieustalona (GUS 2002). 
 
The Act on Minorities which was accepted in 2005 makes a distinction between ethnic 
minorities and national minorities. A national minority is a group: a) less numerous than the 
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rest of the state’s inhabitants; b) differentiated by language, culture or tradition and aiming to 
maintain the differentiation; c) possessing consciousness of historical national community; d) 
inhabiting Polish territory for at least 100 years; e) identifying with the nation organized in a 
state. An ethnic minority shares with the national minority all of its features, except for the 
identification with a nation different than Polish and possessing its own state. This division 
raises disgruntlement and the Polish Tatar Association and Federation of Roma in Poland 
perceive it as deprivation.  
 
According to this definition, there are nine national minorities recognised in Poland (numbers 
in brackets show population declared in the 2002 Census): Belarussians (48 000), Czechs 
(386), Lithuanians (5 846), Germans (152 897), Armenians (1 082), Russians (6 103), Slovaks 
(2 001), Ukrainians (30 957) and Jews (1 133). Polish law, therefore, acknowledges four 
ethnic minorities substantiated historically: Roma (12 855), Tatars (495), Lemkos (5 863) and 
Karaims (43) (GUS 2002). It should be added that according to the law regulating these 
issues, a special category of ‘regional languages’ was added and two such linguistic 
minorities are recognized, i.e. Kashubians  (5 063) and Silesians (173 153). 
 
In scholarly works the last two are sometimes treated as ‘postulated’ or ‘claimed’ minorities. 
In the 1990s, a group of activists declared the existence of a ‘Silesian nation’. It has not been 
recognised by Polish authorities and the Polish Supreme court as well as the European Court 
in Strasbourg denied the group the right to ‘existence’ , the lack of a national historical 
tradition being the main objection. One has to admit that it denies the principle of self-
identification as a decisive factor in questions of national or ethnic belonging. The public was 
shocked when, despite official denial, over 170 thousand persons declared that they are 
Silesians, more than any other minority. It creates a conundrum for scholars on how to 
explain such phenomenon of a nation without history , and various historically grounded 
interpretations have been given (cf. Dolińska 2010: 343-44). However, it also creates a 
schizophrenic situation in which the biggest subjectively chosen national identity is not 
objectively recognised by the state. 
 
The case of the Silesians serves as an example of an existent, but  unrecognised minority. It 
contrasts with the ‘neighbouring’ and historically related national minority of Germans, who 
have always been recognised, even by Communists, and immediately granted some privileges 
after 1991. No doubt,  a powerful state standing behind them helped the latter to get rights . 
Still, the Movement for Silesia’s Autonomy is tolerated, and thanks to electoral success in the 
local elections this year it joined the ruling coalition in the local parliament. It is deemed by 
central authorities as a threat for the state integrity3 
 
Altogether, people have declared 72 various national or ethnic identities. Besides the ones 
listed above, let us mention only those comprising more than one thousand members: 
Vietnamese (1 808), French (1 633), American (1 541), Greek (1404), Italian (1 367),  and 
Bulgarian (1 112)  (GUS 2002). 
 
This is ‘merely’ statistical  data from 2002 and since then the situation has changed. The 
                                                     
3
 Polish President’s adviser Tomasz Nałęcz expressed this view in his interview in Polska The Times on 9 
December 2010 (see; ‘Tomasz Nałęcz: Koalicja PO z RAŚ jest niebezpieczna’ 
http://www.polskatimes.pl/opinie/343551,tomasz-nalecz-koalicja-po-z-ras-jest-
niebezpieczna,id,t.html#material_1 
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difference in status between citizens and ‘not-citizens’ may be confusing, especially the  
differentiation between residents and migrants. Some ‘historical groups, such as the post-1948 
expellees from the domestic-war-torn Greece are not considered a national minority. 
Armenians are classified as a national minority while they perceive themselves as an ethnic 
one (Łodziński 2006: 305) The numbers for minorities and minority activists given by some 
scholars can be two to ten times bigger than those found in the Census. 
 
3.2. Immigrants  
 
Officially there are relatively few migrants coming to Poland each year: 
 
International migration for permanent residence (GUS 2010: 129): 
 
2001-2005……….. 39 119 
2005………………   9 364 
2008………………   15 275 
2009………………   17 424 
 
However, both immigration to Poland and the emigration of Poles abroad have become 
common phenomena. The Central Statistical Office estimates that immigrants in Poland 
constitute less than one percent of the total population of inhabitants of Poland (i.e. app. 
380,000 people). In a country report on Poland in the electronic journal “Focus Migration” 
one can read the following: “It is extremely difficult to quantify Poland’s foreign population 
as there is hardly any official data concerning the ‘stocks’, in other words, the total number of 
foreigners in Poland”. One of the few sources is the 2002 census, which estimates the number 
of foreigners living in Poland at just 49,221 people. This would correspond to just 0.1% of the 
total population. According to the census, the most widely represented nationalities in 2002 
were  Ukrainians (9,881; 20%), Russians (4,325; 8.8%), Germans (3,711; 7.5%), Belarusians 
(2,852; 5.8%), and Vietnamese (2,093; 4.3%). Overall, citizens of southeast European 
countries and the states of the former Soviet Union (excluding the Baltic countries) accounted 
for at least 44% of the foreign population in Poland... In general, however, independent 
experts consider the census numbers, as well as the government population statistics for 
foreigners, to be too low.  
 
By contrast, the International Migration Report 2006 produced by the UN Population 
Division estimates the number of foreigners living in Poland to be 703,000 (2005), 
corresponding to 1.8% of the total population. Despite the low numbers, the issue of 
immigrants is relatively new and complex problem in Poland. Since the early  nineties of the 
twentieth century Poland which has been a traditional ‘migrant sending’ country for   few 
generations, became a destination and transit country. The presence of foreigners, majority of 
whom come from the former Soviet Union, constitutes a new challenge, but also a complex 
dilemma for Polish policy and Poles’ attitudes towards migration (Alscher 2008: 3-4; cf. Also 
Fihel 2008: 33-51). This diagnosis, based on various studies on migrants in Poland seems to 
be adequate and we share it. 
 
In view of the relative homogeneity of the Polish society, new migration poses a challenge. 
Besides the settling of newcomers from the ‘East’ and transit migrants (Iglicka 2001), Poland 
is undergoing  an inflow of refugees from Chechnya, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. 
Also, an increasing number of EU citizens are settling in Poland. However, the percentage of 
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permanent immigrants is still low. Foreigners mostly choose big cities for their place of 
residence, especially the capital. Illegal migrants have problems with their integration in many 
spheres of life, including the job market, education and health (cf. Bloch and Goździak 2010). 
 
3.3. Religious minorities 
 
Statistics show that almost 37 million people in Poland have been baptized in the Roman-
Catholic Church. Other denominations are small and barely visible in the public space. A 
Treaty (Concordate) with the Vatican was quickly signed after the fall of communism and the 
Catholic Church enjoys many privileges. Already in 1989, the parliament “accepted a bill 
thanks to which the Church was granted back confiscated rural lands” (Buchowski 2009: 71). 
A reprivatisation bill for individuals has not been passed.  
 
Next to the State, the Catholic Church is the largest property owner in the country, with up to 
200 thousand hectares in its hands. Public discourses are permeated with religious authorities' 
opinions. The presence of crosses in public places like hospitals, schools and Parliament is 
obviously unquestionable. Abortion law is one of the strictest in Europe. Disputes over moral 
issues (e.g. in vitro) and the presence of religion in the public sphere have no end. Smaller 
‘brothers in faith’ are treated paternalistically. A conflict between Catholics and  Greco-
Catholics over the issue of who should own the major basilica, a former cathedral of the 
Uniates, in Przemyśl, in south-eastern Poland illustrates the case in point. Despite the appeal 
of Pope John Paul II, it was taken over by the Catholics who changed its style  from ‘eastern’, 
with a cupola, to ‘western-like’, with a spiral tower (Hann 1998; 2001; 2006: 184-187). 
Religious classes in public schools are treated as given, but are secured basically only for 
Catholic students; alternative classes in ethics, granted by law are taught only in 2.5% of 
schools. Meanwhile, the society shows many characteristics of western-like secularisation – 
concubines are common, the proportion of children born out of wedlock is systematically 
increasing (ca. 15%), and the divorce rate is high (30%) (cf. Buchowski 2010). 
 
3.4. Case studies 
 
In order to show the challenges of multiculturalism in Poland over the past 30 years, we have 
to choose from several cases that illustrate the point. Anti-Semitism, which is present in 
Polish folk culture (cf. Cała 2005), in daily life and politics (Krzemiński 1993; 2001) could be 
the case in point, but today “in Poland, there is no ‘Jewish question.’ There is a problem of 
anti-Semitism, the persistence of which bears out accepted wisdom: anti-Semitism is a 
problem of anti-Semites” (Borodziej 2001: 67).  
 
Ambiguous attitudes towards the German minority have its roots in 19
th
 century nationalism 
and the politics of Germanisation that took a genocide form during WWII. It was constantly 
utilised by communist authorities in raising fears and animosities (Madajczyk 1998). Post-
1989 politics can also, from time to time, evoke ghosts (Kurcz 1997), as is expressed in the 
access negotiations with the EU, the possibility of purchasing land in the Polish western 
territories (cf. Buchowski 2010a: 334). However, these topics are exploited in the literature 
and are currently not hotly discussed public issues. We have decided to study two groups – 
the Roma and Muslims. The first has been perceived as  stereotypical social outcasts and 
discriminated for ages; the second has re-appeared in social consciousness under a new guise 
of an Islamic threat, which is abstract in the Polish context. We think that these cases will 
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allow us to identify the key features of the discourse on cultural diversity and the practices 
designed to cope with the diversity that has re-appeared in Poland after fifty years of absence.  
 
Selecting these groups was, on the one hand motivated by their dissimilarity, which might be 
perceived as more radical than in the case of less culturally and/or religiously detached 
groups. Also,  Poles show strong attitudes towards these groups. In the research on social 
distance and hostility of Poles towards foreign ethnic groups, Roma and Muslims
4
 are disliked 
most (CBOS 2007: 2-3; Nowicka 1997: 60-63). In a number of polls carried out in the last 
fifteen years, Roma, and since 2001 Arabs, have been the least accepted minorities. More than 
fifty per-cent of the people asked dislike them.  
 
Recently, reluctance towards Roma has decreased to 15% – a significant change from the  
three quarters in the mid-1990s. Aversion to Arabs is unchangeably high, and increases in the 
periods of media debates on terrorist attacks (CBOS 2007: 5; CBOS 2010: 4).  
 
 
3.4.1. Roma in Poland 
 
The estimates provided in 2002 by the local authorities, based on information submitted by 
local government units, imply that there are 20 000 Roma in Poland
5
. Roma NGOs give 
numbers ranging between 20 and 30 thousand. Roma are divided along caste-like lines as well 
as territorial lines, which today can be related to the competition in running projects realised 
by Roma activists. They are also divided according to socio-economic distinctions, e.g. 
between town and countryside dwellers and ones related to tribe/caste/class (cf. Mirga 1998: 
116-117). 
 
In the 2005 Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language, Roma are 
recognized as an ethnic minority, as they have resided in Poland for more than a century 
(Talewicz-Kwiatkowska 2010: 114). They are a heterogeneous and internally divided 
minority, which impedes attempts at establishing a strategy for life improvement and 
cooperation in this community. 
 
3.4.1.1. Changes in the course of history 
 
Roma started arriving on Polish lands in the 14
th
 century; by the 16
th
 century, concerns with 
their isolation, nomadic life and economic activity began to grow and the first legislations 
restricting their freedom of movement
6
 and expelling them had been issued. The policy of 
‘oppressive tolerance’ lasted for centuries. During WWII, Roma became victims of drastic 
Nazi exterminations, being placed in ghettos and sent to concentration camps. For instance, 
there existed a special Zigeunerlager in Auschwitz-Birkenau. Altogether, about 500 000 
Roma lost their lives in Porrajmos, the Roma Holocaust in Europe. Its memory has not been 
cultivated for decades, and only in recent years, the Romani elites have started to try to restore 
it and use it in building a common identity. 
                                                     
4
 Tatars (see below) are treated as a colourful ethnographic group  and not taken into account in studies on 
acceptance of diversity. 
5
 Ministry’s of Internal Affairs and Administration: http://www.mswia.gov.pl/portal/pl/185/2982/Tresc_Programu.html 
(viewed on 30.09.2010) 
6
 First Polish edict of this nature was passed in 1558 (Talewicz-Kwiatkowska 2010: 116). 
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After WWII, Roma’s status was extremely low. The majority were illiterate, and they did not 
receive state benefits and allowances. They were forcefully assimilated (see above). A State 
Council resolution from 1960 forced nomadic groups (and in the 1950s still half of Roma led 
a nomadic life) to settle and work in the industry or agriculture. The lack of understanding of 
cultural otherness by the patronising authorities motivated by assimilationist ideology, 
permeated by ingrained prejudices against Gypsies, was striking (Puckett 2005: 622). 
Multiculturalism and tolerance were alien to communists. This resulted in multiple 
repressions and police surveillance, as well as the exacerbation of social stereotypes 
concerning Roma (Mirga 1998). Simultaneously, forced settlement resulted in a gradual shift 
from traditional activities, which was not accompanied by replacing them with new forms of 
earning the living. This contributed to a significant deterioration in the economic situation of 
the Roma community, which in many cases remains unchanged until today (Talewicz-
Kwiatkowska 2010: 118). 
 
Since 1989, improvements in the social status of Roma have been more a result of 
international pressure having its origin in the need for alignment with European standards, 
than the efforts of successive Polish governments (Puckett 2005: 625). It began changing at 
the end of the 1990s, when a growing number of violent incidents against Roma together with 
the high costs of post-socialist transition led  the Romani people to establish their own 
representation. This enabled the formation of non-governmental organizations which struggle 
for the preservation of Roma cultural identity and the use of governmental funding, and 
participation in European and state programs supporting the minority. 
 
One of the reasons for the ‘othering’ of Roma in Poland is their racial (darker skin) and 
cultural difference. They form a basis for creating stereotypes about ‘Gypsies’: laziness, 
isolationism, unpleasant smell, untidiness, disorder, demanding attitude, hooliganism, etc. 
(Nowicka 1997: 207-212). These images are combined with differences in customs and group 
endogamy, both in terms of kinship and socialising. Together these perceptions ensue in the 
lack of acceptance (Nowicka 1999a: 9). Difficulties in cooperation between Roma and the 
authorities are based on a poor understanding of group specificity and cultural distinctiveness 
(language taboo, compliance with group rules, and absolute loyalty to of the family) on the 
one hand, and the reluctance of the Roma to meet requirements of the dominant society, on 
the other. 
 
One of the reasons for the persisting low socio-economic status and the social exclusion of 
Roma in Poland is the lack of cooperation between the Bergitka Roma and the Polish Roma. 
The main issue in this inner-group conflict relates to the alleged lack of ritual purity of the 
Bergitka Roma. Relatively long-lasting settlement in the Carpathian region made this group 
relatively more assimilated to the surrounding communities. Still, even there, the divisions are 
still striking (Nowicka1997). Pilot programs of school education for children and transformed 
strategies of social work were addressed solely to Roma in this region and due to a lack of 
communication, hardly transposed to other groups. 
 
 
3.4.1.2 Education of Romani children – a means of overcoming isolation? 
The situation of Roma in the era of political and economic transformation in the early 1990’s 
made it clear to leaders that education is a prerequisite for full participation in the socio-
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economic world. The slowly developing Roma elites realised that poor education is the major 
reason for the low status of Roma. In the mid-1990’s efforts were made7 to eliminate illiteracy 
among Roma and to create opportunities for the younger generations. However, the cultural 
specificity of Roma was not properly diagnosed, which resulted in inefficiencies in the 
educational programs
8
 introduced. 
 
In addition to internal divisions of Roma in Poland based on ideological grounds, a key factor 
in disabling the social functioning of this group is the related low percentage of educated 
people, which obviously reduces Roma participation in society, especially in view of the fact 
that modern economy requires skilled professionals (Majewicz 1999: 128).  
 
According to some estimations (the 2002 Census did not provide adequate data on Roma; 
experts hope that the National Census of 2011 will provide more reliable data), only 70% of 
Roma children participate in formal education
9
, and there is widespread illiteracy among the 
elders. In some local communities hardly any children attend schools regularly, because they 
are engaged in their families’ economic activities, including periods of travelling, which 
means school absence. The fact is that ‘truancy from school by Gypsy children, which was an 
ongoing problem for decades, was not only tolerated but often encouraged, and was 
eventually accepted by the authorities: the resistance to attendance was on the part of both 
children and their parents’ (ibidem). 
 
Another issue connected to educational problems is the practice of  the ritual of kidnapping 
girls between 13 and 16 years of age for marital purposes, which is one of the reasons why 
Roma send girls to school unwillingly. Also, disrespect to Romanipen rules (e.g. restrictions 
concerning the dress code) shown by teachers and headmasters, present an obstacle in 
overcoming difficulties in Roma education (see: GW 2010/ 210). Negative attitudes of other 
children towards Roma pupils are also of great significance
10
. 
 
The above problems are secondary in relation to the main obstacle, i.e. cultural rules 
underlying the use of non-Roma language. This calls into question the effectiveness of 
education regarding the Roma in general, since there are at least two reasons for Roma to 
reject the educational offer: (1) Polish is a foreign language to most of Romani children which 
causes learning difficulties at the very beginning of school, and
11
 (2) integrational classes are 
unattractive or even deterrent to some Roma parents because of the high expectations with 
respect to the integration of children coming from various cultural backgrounds. Thus, the 
solution would be to create a motivational program for the Roma communities, which would 
                                                     
7
 Catholic priest Stanisław Opocki introduced classes for Roma children in Nowy Sącz region in 1993 
(Majewicz 1999: 128). 
8
 See Ministry’s of Internal Affairs and Administration report on Pilot Programme: 
http://www.mswia.gov.pl/portal/pl/185/2982/Tresc_Programu.html 
9
 Ministry’s of Internal Affairs and Administration data downloaded at: 
http://www.mswia.gov.pl/portal/pl/185/2982/Tresc_Programu.html 
10
 According to the CBOS survey of 2002, 30% of school children asked whom do not they wish to share the 
bench with responded that a Romani child would be least welcome. Only homosexuals and mentally ill were 
perceived as less desirable (Talewicz-Kwiatkowska 2010: 124). 
11
 Teaching Roma in Romani language  is a recommendation for the Polish Government made by the  EU, but 
there have been no claims from the community in question (ECRI 2010: 19; see also: 
http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,5912003,Szkola_bez_segregacji__szkola_bez_Romow_.html) 
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raise awareness  in the field of the educational needs of children
12
, which permanently alter 
the deep resentment  to social inclusion (Różycka 2009: 29). So far, government agents 
responsible for the preparation of educational programs for Roma are unable to cope with this 
task
13
.  
 
Despite difficulties, some affirmative changes ought to be mentioned. One of them is the 
introduction of Roma education assistants into schools, together with hiring assistant teachers 
who should help parents, children and teachers to coordinate education in the community. The 
educational assistant comes from the Roma community, knows the local dialect and has at 
least primary education. S/he is usually a member of the local community and, thus, has a 
good knowledge of the  families’ situation. Practice shows, however, that this initiative raises 
a lot of accusations and grievances on both sides. In one of the provinces in Silesia, all 16 
permanent posts created for Roma education assistants in schools stirred up conflicts between 
schools’ authorities and the Roma leaders who questioned the merits of such decisions. Roma 
communities prefer receiving increased allowances from the state over the long-term benefits 
of  education. On the other hand, Polish teachers protested against favouring minority 
members
14
 over ethnic Poles (education assistants receive a salary similar to that of Polish 
teachers who need to have a higher education and constantly improve their qualifications). 
 
Pro-Roma activists also speak about the reluctance of local governments to make the required 
effort to diagnose the situation of Polish-Romani conflicts in the area and to seek effective 
solutions (Różycka 2009: 27). 
 
The situation in Romani education in Poland outlined above results in constant EU 
recommendations, published repeatedly since the end of 1990’s. Their main points focus 
 on: 1) the abolition of separate Roma classes in schools
15
; 2) making efforts to persuade 
Roma parents about the advantages of education for their children; 3) preparing the 
possibilities of pre-schooling for Roma children in order to overcome the difficulties related 
to the lack of the knowledge of the Polish language
16
 (ECRI 2010: 18-20). Although some 
improvements have been made, there is still an unsatisfactory level of Roma children’s 
engagement in school education and the state’s attention to ensuring basic minority rights.  
 
In addition to educational issues which require a strong reaction of the state in dialogue with 
the Roma community, there is the problem of Roma unemployment, and, in fact, an 
increasingly widening gap between the demands of the labour market and the opportunities 
for Roma to actively participate in it. Data from Romani NGOs indicate that they are unable 
to keep jobs for extended periods of time and face discrimination based on their ethnic 
distinctions from both employers and co-workers. These two issues are strongly co-related 
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 Polish law provides means against parents who discourage their children’s education, but it is usually not 
enforced by authorities in the case of Roma (ECRI 2010: 19). 
13
 Which is a part of a wider problem of poor cooperation between policy makers and researchers specialising in 
studying minorities in Poland. 
14
 This argument about favouring Roma to Poles appears in situations of conflict between the Poles and Roma 
due to the belief about the great riches of the Roma gained illegally channels. 
15
 Ministry’s of Education data indicate that in the face of creating integration classes for Roma children, over 
50% of the pupils did not show up at school. The Ministry has not prepared any strategies addressed to the 
parents because they cannot find professionals able to advise them 
(http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,5912003,Szkola_bez_segregacji__szkola_bez_Romow_.html).  
16
 Which seems very unrealistic in the face of shortage of places in pre-school facilities in Poland. 
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and must be addressed simultaneously if any improvement in Roma's situation is to be made 
(Puckett 2005: 628). 
 
3.4.1.3. Violent incidents 
In the early 1990s, Roma were often the target of attacks carried out by racist groups 
(individuals or groups of individuals and households were raided by young sympathisers of 
neo-Nazism). In addition, a recurrent problem was the slowness of the police and the courts in 
solving matters of this type of violence and the denial of justice for Romani victims of crimes 
motivated racially, as well as cases of   police abuse (ERRC 2002: 6-8). Including numerous 
cases of discrimination related to access to housing, medical care and social welfare, the 
situation of Roma in Poland has raised many concerns,
17
 as Roma started receiving greater 
attention because of ‘the notion that the treatment of minorities is an extremely important 
indicator of democracy’ (Puckett 2005: 622).  
 
Minor attacks occur spontaneously, bigger pogroms are usually sparked by some acts of 
Roma which are perceived as unacceptable. Such a situation occurred in Mława in 1991, 
when 200 people had been attacking Roma buildings for two days, inflicting destruction in 
their possessions, and destroying twenty houses. Authorities introduced a curfew. Most Roma 
managed to escape the city before the riots erupted (ERRC 2002: 1931-1932; Majewicz 1999: 
132). Fortunately there were no fatalities. Ex post facto analysis has shown the importance of 
both ethnic and non-ethnic factors in this event (Giza-Poleszczuk and Poleszczuk 2001: 234-
44). The court classified the perpetrators' acts as crimes committed on ethnic grounds. Similar 
incidents, although of a smaller scale, occur from time to time in some Romani settlements. 
 
The most recent event occurred in Limanowa in July 2010. A mob of over a hundred people 
armed with stones and bottles of petrol attacked a Roma family living in a block of flats, 
shouting ‘let us finish with Roma’. Authorities responded by calling special police units from 
Cracow; after a few hours, the crowd scattered causing no damage
18
. The issue was addressed 
by the ombudsman and local mediators brokered the talks between the parties.  
 
Instances of violence against members of Romani communities, anti-Roma graffiti, and 
newspaper articles, all confirm the presence of a negative stereotype of Roma in Poland. 
Despite educational and developmental programs and a growing scholarly interest in Roma, 
they remain the group with the lowest status among the cultural and ethnic minorities in 
Poland. 
 
3.4.2 Polish Muslims and Muslims in Poland  
 
In a Catholic and homogeneous country like Poland, significant cultural distinction 
comparable to the one represented by Roma, which might be classified as ‘racial-cum-
cultural’, is relatively rare. Muslims who live in Poland, and whose distinctiveness is based, 
first of all, on religious difference, comprise another group. The followers of Islam in Poland 
may be divided into three, not entirely congruent groups: 
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 (1) Tatar Poles who have been living in Poland for several centuries; (2) immigrants from 
Arab countries who came to Poland in the 1970’s mainly as students – they often contracted  
mixed marriages with Poles and have permanent residence permissions; and (3) new Muslim 
immigrants, such as (a) refugees from Bosnia (Marciniak 2004), (b) political asylum seekers 
from Chechnya and some other Muslim countries like Pakistan or Afghanistan. In our 
analysis, we have divided them simply into  ‘historical’ Muslim community and ‘newcomers.’ 
 
Polish Tatars are Muslims, but are at the same time treated as a familiar component of the 
Polish cultural landscape and, in some ways, a legacy of Poland’s multicultural past. New 
Muslim immigrants have started coming to Poland in the 1970’s – they are relatively few, 
although more numerous than Tartars. This group is constantly growing, especially because of 
incoming students and professionals from Arab countries. The number of all Muslims living 
in Poland does not exceed 30 000 people (Włoch 2009: 60).  
 
The situation of these two groups is totally different and the analysis of their status and 
perception serves as an indicator of accepted patterns for assimilation and forbearance 
towards strangers and otherness in Polish society. It should enable us to assess the potential of 
tolerance for immigrants coming to Poland.  
 
3.4.2.1 Tatars 
 
Tatars  are part of a Turkic ethnic group numbering 10 million in the late 20
th
  century, most 
of whom live in Russia (app. 5 500 000 people). Turkey, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan – each have Tatar populations greater 
than 30 000. 
 
Polish Tatars, called the Lipka Tatars (the Turkish name of Lithuania, which they originally 
inhabited), are descendants of Muslim settlers in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania
19
  
from the 14
th
 century. From the battle of Grunwald onwards, the Tatar light cavalry regiments 
took part in military campaigns of the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania and benefited 
from their military service by receiving titles and land. Their rights to personal and religious 
freedom had practically never been questioned. Many integrated into Polish gentry or local 
communities in the north-eastern part of the Commonwealth by intergroup marriages. Tatars 
assimilated as they gradually lost their language and began to use Polish and Belarusian 
instead. They accepted local habits and cultural features of the surrounding Christian and 
Slavic population. Polygamy became a virtually banned practice, vodka, which is prohibited 
by the Koran has become an acceptable product; and religious manuscripts started to be 
written in a mixed idiom of Polish, Belarusian and Russian. 
 
Religion was an integral part of their identity and many clung to it invariantly. Over time, 
modified Islam was preserved as the only real distinctive factor of Tatars and the core of their 
ethnic and/or cultural identity. At the turn of the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries, anti-Islamic 
expressions were virtually non-existent in Poland (Włoch 2009: 59) and Tatars had generally 
not experienced major forms of discrimination because of their religious difference 
(Warmińska 1997: 233). Their presence has been accepted for the last six centuries. 
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The name ‘Polish Tatars’ was popularised in the interwar period, when the resurrected Polish 
state was redefining the inter-ethnic relations within the new boundaries. Before 1914, Tatars 
lived mainly in the Lithuanian  part of the  Commonwealth and were called ‘Lithuanian 
Tatars’. After WWI, forced migrations  affected also the Tatars and they crystallised their 
ethnic identity under the auspices of the Polish State. The new name was accepted as 
synonymous with the ethnic group. The community strengthened internal ties and its visibility 
in the new context. The Muslim Religious Association (founded in 1925) and the Association 
of Cultural and Educational Tatars of Poland were established with the aim to consolidate 
Islam believers. 
  
In the interwar period, Tatar culture was thriving, they had a right to pastoral care in the army, 
religious education was developed, they were fully recognised by the authorities and 
perceived as faithful and devoted members of the new Republic. Tatars even redirected 
money collected by the community for the initial purpose of building a mosque in Warsaw to 
the National Defence Fund before WWII (Włoch 2009: 59). 
 
WWII profoundly changed their situation. Numerous settlements and mosques are now 
located beyond the eastern Polish border. In 1945, returnee-Tatars settled in the newly 
acquired Polish western territories. It led to several local conflicts over their religious (and 
ethnic) distinction. The socialist nation’s ideology excluded difference. In result, part of the 
community returned to its places of origin in the 1960’s. Many moved closer to the old Tatar 
settlements near Białystok, in the north-east of Poland, i.e. the Podlasie region, where they 
live to this day. 
 
Cultural and religious life did not flourish as vigorously as before WWI. Tatar intellectuals 
were killed or they migrated to the West. Contact with the outside Muslim world was almost 
impossible. Assimilation, which lasted for ages, made the community almost invisible. Today, 
Tatars live  mostly in big cities,  and they have merged with the Polish society. They continue 
contracting marriages with Christians, and some have stopped practicing Islam (Warmińska 
1997: 234). 
 
3.4.2.2 Current status 
 
Between the 14
th
 and 18
th
 centuries there were app. 4 000 Tatars living in the Commonwealth. 
In the interwar period 5 500 Tatars inhabited the new Republic. After WWII, the estimated 
Tatar population oscillated around 3 000 people. Thus, they constitute a very small proportion 
of a country with more than 38 million citizens.  
 
Tatars participate in Polish culture, but at the same time reproduce their ethnic distinctiveness 
on the basis of religion. As mentioned, they are recognised as an ethnic minority. Polish 
Tatars speak Polish, have a deep sense of belonging to their Polish homeland, and do not 
identify themselves with any other country. This differentiates them from some other 
minorities in Poland, which often identify themselves with neighbouring or distant states, 
which is interpreted by some Poles as an anti-Polish attitude (Warmińska 1997: 243). One can 
say that the Tatar identity in Poland is engendered by their religious identity, a mythical 
attachment to the historical community of origin and multiple elements shared with Polish 
culture. Despite apparent contradictions between Islam and the image of Polish culture, as 
impregnated by Catholic Christianity, the identity of the Polish Tatars combines these two 
threads (Warmińska 1997: 244). 
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One can also read that due to the lack of their own theological schools, ignorance of the 
Arabic language, and location far from the centres of Muslim culture and liturgical life, Polish 
Tatars have merely superficial knowledge of Islam, which contains many elements which are 
foreign to them. However, as some scholars claim, this may give a local character to their 
beliefs, but does not contradict the main tenets of Islam (Droździkowska 2006: 97). 
  
After 1989, in the upsurge of ethnic movements and the re-emerging of minority communities 
of all kinds, Tatars began efforts to rebuild and revive their ethnic identity. The revival 
resulted in the creation of periodic cultural and educational events (festivals, workshops and 
summer schools)
20
, the establishment of Tatar press and other media that are meant to 
reinforce awareness of Tatar presence in the Polish cultural landscape, the dissemination of 
knowledge about the community’s distinctiveness, and help in rebuilding inter-group identity, 
which was partly lost in the course of history (Warmińska 2009: 37). 
 
In the National Census of 2002, less than five hundred people declared Tatar nationality, six 
times less than it is estimated. It indirectly shows that Tatars, a totem of the exotic past and 
the mythical Polish tolerance of diversity, proved to be almost completely assimilated 
(Warmińska 209: 36). This is probably why they are so easily accepted as ‘us’, or, as Gerd 
Bauman would claim, ‘encompassed’ as a part of ‘us’ (2006: 25-27). They serve as a proof of 
the centuries-old Polish tolerance and as an evidence, used by politicians, that in the last 
decades the country has not had problems with ethnic, cultural and religious diversity – 
provided that the others ‘behave’ and are peaceful and tamed.  
 
3.4.2.2 Non-Tatar Muslims 
 
Apart from Tatars, the population of Polish Muslims comprises people of Arab extraction 
who arrived in Poland in the 1970’s and 1980’s as students, and later as professionals, such as 
businessmen, engineers or diplomats, as well as refugees and asylum seekers from the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. Recently, more Muslims have arrived in Poland, some of them 
entrepreneurs or well-paid employees. Nonetheless, these new Muslims do not comprise a 
significant minority. As the estimates show, their population may reach 30 000 people, which 
is 0.1% of the Polish society. 
 
The arriving Muslims  do not have easy relations with the Tatars. They blame the Tatars for 
polluting Islam with alien elements and deny their tradition. Competition can be observed as 
young new Muslims established the Muslim League in Poland, the Association of Muslim 
Students, and Muslim Brothers Association, all of which are composed of young devotees of 
Islam, including a small group of converts from Catholicism (Włoch 2009: 60). Educated 
Muslims disapprove of the folklore present in Tatar tradition and claim that ‘Tatars often have 
little in common with more recent groups of Islam such as Arabs or converts, who are 
sometimes particularly radical’ (Włoch 2009: 62). Inner boundaries among Muslim groups 
are becoming visible. 
 
Recently, Chechens have become one of the most important Muslim groups in Poland. Many 
from the about 5 000 refugees who came to Poland after the first war in Chechnya have lived 
                                                     
20
 Polish policy towards minorities still has a tendency to folklorise cultural and ethnic difference 
(Warmińska 2009: 37).  
Michał Buchowski and Katarzyna Chlewińska 
22 
for a long time in twenty refugee camps, comprising a majority of refugee status applicants 
nationwide. However, the status is granted  unwillingly, (which  raises the applicants' 
protests
21)
, even though most of them treat Poland as a transit country to the old EU states 
(Włoch 2009: 61).  
 
Supervised by the Office of Refugees and living in camps, the Chechens appear in public 
discourse only during protests against Polish procedures and the poor quality of aid for 
refugees. They tend to be absent in debates about diversity, especially those concerning 
Muslims' presence in the society. The attitude towards them is ambiguous. One the one hand, 
they are perceived as victims of Russian oppression, and on the other, as radical Muslims that 
might cause problems. However, when the case of a woman, who in her attempt to cross the 
Polish border in the Carpathian mountains lost her three children and saved only one son, was 
made public, Poles reacted immediately and showed her sympathy and gave her help . She 
was even offered permanent housing by an individual family 
 
All in all, Muslims are not an object of any particular attention of the public, authorities or the 
media, with some rare exceptions (see below). One can call the attitude towards them an 
‘indifferent tolerance.’ Their religious associations are recognized by the state22, and other 
Muslim organisations function as other NGOs. Muslim schools are non-existent, but 
educational authorities permit the use classrooms in public schools during the weekend for 
religious education. So far, there have been no conflicts related to the dress of Muslim women 
in schools or in any other context (Włoch 2009: 60). 
 
3.4.2.2.1 Warsaw mosque
23
 
 
Today there are five Muslim mosques in Poland. Two of them, situated in Kruszyniany and 
Bohoniki, are small wooden buildings of historic value, built between the 17
th
 and 18
th
 
centuries in north-eastern Poland for Tatars inhabiting nearby villages. They do not raise any 
controversy and have become tourist attractions on the Tatar Trail
24
 in the Podlasie region. 
There is also a brick mosque in Gdańsk, built in 1989, and a meeting place and prayer room in 
Poznań, which since 2006 also houses the Association of Muslim Students.  
 
The fifth object is the meeting place of the Warsaw Muslims, located – as is the case of 
Poznań – in a private villa, adapted for this purpose in 1993. However, it is too small for the 
growing Warsaw community, which is now larger than 10 000 persons . The election of a new 
mufti, Tomasz Miśkiewicz, educated in Saudi Arabia, lent a new impetus to the issue of the 
construction of a mosque in Warsaw. The Muslim Religious Association is negotiating the 
return of a parcel confiscated by the communist government
25
, where they want to build a 
                                                     
21
 The latest protest was organized by a group of 200 Chechen and Georgian refugees who were trying to get to 
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larger  mosque. The Warsaw municipal architect objected the mosque’s project, proposing a 
building that would commemorate the long tradition of Muslim, i.e. Tatar presence in Poland. 
Since then, no progress has been made in this respect (Włoch 2009: 60). 
 
In 2001, the Muslim League in Poland, led by Samira Ismail, was formed; it also attracts 
mostly immigrants from Arab countries (Stefaniuk 2010: 180). One of the organisation’s 
main aims is to build a Muslim Community Centre in Warsaw. It will comprise a mosque, 
library and meeting space. The centre will serve not only religious, but also educational 
purposes,  as well the purpose of popularising Islamic culture among Poles. Moreover, it will 
be used by Muslim charities, women and children, and other Muslim groups. It will also serve 
as a place for holding exhibitions Contacts with the media should help build bridges between 
the Arab-Muslims and Poles. Now, the construction is underway and it is expected to be 
completed in late autumn of 2010. The project is feasible thanks to the financial support from 
a Saudi sponsor. It became known because of the protests accompanying its completion. 
 
The protest against the building of the mosque was organised by the Association of the Future 
of Europe. In March 2010, a demonstration was held at the mosque building site. Protesters 
claimed that the Muslim League in Poland represents a radical wing of Islam. Referring to the 
fact that the Saudi Arabian project sponsor is a follower of Wahhabi Islam  (in Poland Sunni 
Islam is dominant), the association fears it may create a centre of radicalism and terrorism. 
The protest
26
, attended by less than fifty people, was accompanied by a counter manifestation 
of an association protesting against intolerance towards religious, ethnic and cultural 
diversity.  
 
In the spirit of constitutional provisions
27
, the Common Council of Catholics and Muslims 
supports the mosque initiative in Warsaw. Since the protest, press comments and opinions of 
both the opponents and supporters of the mosque  in Warsaw, the brunt of public discussion 
moved to the Internet. A website ‘Mosque-ochota.pl’28, where citizens express their opinions, 
has been established by a right-wing Warsaw councillor. What dominates in the  comments, 
are concerns about the presence of followers of radical Islam in Poland, associated primarily 
with the terrorist attacks, and indiscriminate, superficial opinions on the values promoted by 
Islam . 
 
 3.4.2.2.2 Poznań minaret 
 
A similar reaction, illustrating the attitude of Poles towards the symbolic aspects of the 
Muslim presence in Poland, was sparked by the project of Joanna Rajkowska
29
. She proposed 
an artistic installation that would make an old chimney in the city centre look like a Muslim 
minaret. The project was meant to raise discussion about Polish attitudes towards cultural 
distinction and was to be part of the Malta Theatre Festival, a huge annual cultural event that 
alludes to multiculturalism
30
. The project sparked a heated discussion that resulted in rejecting 
the idea by the city authorities. The Association of Polish Architects in Poznań did not 
(Contd.)                                                                  
population in Poland was mostly poor at that time, and the initiative was interrupted by the WWII (Polityka 
2010: 82). 
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recommend the proposal
31
 on the grounds that it would constitute a culturally alien object. 
Although approved by Muslims as a symbolic item, the Association claimed that it would 
offend Muslims as it would be improperly located between the Jewish synagogue (which has 
been used as a swimming pool since WWII!) and a church building. 
 
Internet forums were filled with disputes
32
 and protest letters were sent to local authorities.  
Rajkowska was accused of promoting Islam, religious provocation and wasting public funds. 
The arguments concerning the spreading of the idea of radical Islam that pose a threat to the 
interest and values of the Polish, inherently Christian society, were as common as in the 
discussion about the construction of the mosque in Warsaw. Instead of a minaret, the city 
council has committed itself to supporting an educational project (lead by an anthropologist 
from Warsaw)
33
 for high school students in Poznań, with classes on cultural differences and 
relativism, perhaps with special attention paid to Muslims. 
 
 
3.5.2.3 Islamophobia without Muslims 
 
The arrival of Muslims from Arab countries raised concerns about ‘our Muslims”, i.e. Polish 
Tatars that are in danger of being influenced by radical Islamists or, at best, will deviate from 
their traditions facilitating coexistence with Poles. These comments indicate a generalised 
reluctance of most Poles to aliens and to ‘incomprehensible’ cultural practices, which are, in 
fact, known only through stereotypical images co-created by the sensation-greedy media. No 
special desire to learn more about ‘otherness’ and no sincere need for dialogue with ‘the 
Others’ can be observed. Beyond academic circles, debates about multiculturalism are 
practically absent. However, increasing migration and claims of Muslims in the country, 
together with foreign news about the ‘war on terror’, the involvement of Polish troops  in 
military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as cultural conflicts in Europe (e.g. over 
dress codes and minarets), cause this issue to be occasionally  discussed – see both the 
Warsaw and Poznań cases (Weinar 2008: 14).   
 
A comparison of the situation of the different groups of Muslims living in Poland and of the 
different attitudes towards them shows that the Polish discourse on diversity and tolerance 
focuses on racial and cultural differences, and, in this particular context, on religious matters 
only as a secondary issue . The example of the Tatars shows that their confession does not 
make them ‘alien’ and they are fully accepted, even boasted34. The negative attitude towards 
Muslims, mostly Arabs, of those questioned in opinion polls,  (CBOS, 2010: 4), ensues from 
cultural and racial difference. Cultural distance is strengthened by western-centric 
islamophobia incited by the events of September 11. 
 
Polish Muslims do not engage in spectacular political activities and avoid comments on 
current political events. Their distinction is above all demonstrated on religious grounds. Only 
exceptionally do Muslim leaders make statements addressing heated issues, such as terrorist 
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 During celebrations of  the year of immigration and multiculturalism,  Polish authorities proposed to show 
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cohabitation (Weinar 2008: 14). 
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attacks or the kidnapping of Polish citizens in the Middle East. Despite this low key presence, 
they have faced xenophobic reactions. In these apex moments,  Poles seem to implicitly  share 
Huntington’s media-propagated thesis on the clash of civilizations and they present Islam as a 
religion of terrorists
35
 (Stefaniuk 2010: 183-185). 
 
Muslims face discrimination on the grounds of xenophobia, which may be called ‘phantom 
Islamophobia’ (Włoch 2009: 65) - a negative attitude towards the community, which, unlike 
in Western Europe, is not based on conflicts resulting from eye-striking and ‘unacceptable’ 
dissimilarities in cultural practices. This Islamophobia probably derives from the same source 
in which anti-Semitism is rooted . In Poland, both Jews and Muslims/Arabs barely exist and 
function as ‘imagined communities’  that threaten national and religious interests 
(Zgliszczyński 2008: 7; Robotycki 2010: 103).  
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4. Definitions of tolerance/acceptance in Poland 
 
First, the basic assumptions of discourse on tolerance should be explained, especially that it 
tends to be departed from cultural reality and everyday practice. 
 
There is a deep-rooted conviction of the Polish public, instilled in peoples’ minds already in 
elementary schools, and partly shared by academic experts, that the Nobles Republic, up until 
the partitions took place, was a multicultural, tolerant country, allowing for a peaceful 
coexistence of many diverse cultural groups (see part 3). This argument justifies the claim, repeated by 
politicians and journalists, that contemporary Poles are tolerant and keen on multiculturalism in their 
very nature, and that the Polish nation welcomes diversity (Tokarczyk 1979: 10). No serious study 
critically analysing the possible intellectual links between the concept of a multi-ethnic historical 
Polish state and today's state of mind and practices of Poles can be found. Moreover, demands to 
restore and nurture the traditional Mythical Polish tolerance, which were advanced after 1989,  
ignore a huge change in collective consciousness that occurred during the years of the 
partitions (e.g. the emergence of competing nationalisms), interwar nationalist politics, war 
radicalisation of nationalist re-sentiments, and more than 50 years of Realpolitik of the 
Communist authorities that skilfully utilised ethnic stereotypes (Robotycki 2010: 80).  
 
4.1. Tolerance as public policy 
 
Reluctance towards minorities demonstrated under communism, also influenced the attitudes 
of Poles, who constitute a decisive majority in the society, in the redefinition of mutual 
relations  during the process of accession to European structures. The National Census of 
2002 indicates a huge gap between the estimated size of minorities and the actual declaration 
in the polls. These results raised questions about census methodology and quality. Minority 
leaders complained that people did not understand the questions about their identity. Besides, 
we are dealing here with social mimicry, which occurs when members of minority groups 
hide their distinct identity fearing intolerance (Robotycki 2010: 82). This is interpreted as a 
direct consequence of the homogenising and assimilationist policy of the authoritarian regime 
before 1989 (Warmińska 2009: 37). 
 
4.2. Parliamentary debates on difference 
 
In 1989, a new chapter in the state policy towards national minorities was opened. The new 
authorities declared the will to break with the communist assimilationist policy (Łodziński 
2005: 124) and grant every citizen civic rights secured by international conventions. They 
also wanted to change Pole’s attitudes  to minorities and redefine state – minority relations, 
aiming both at their integration and active participation in public life. 
 
Parliamentary debates on the ‘otherness’ in Poland  reveal that politicians perceive unified 
national identity as a fundament of the Polish state (Trapani 2009: 91). This unquestioned 
value must be protected by all means, and flaws on the monolith can undermine this unity. 
Minorities’ claims aimed at strengthening their presence, are often viewed as endangering this 
integrity. This  implies the dismissal of many claims and a sort of soft discriminatory policy. 
The Preamble to the Constitution, which is cited in Part 2, makes this attitude visible. Its 
message is clear: ‘we are at home’, and ‘you are welcomed, but do not demand too much’.  
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Polish identity refers  to the ethnic concept of a nation and cultural practices are considered 
Polish, provided that they can be legitimised as such. This means that the discourse on 
national identity is invariably based on cultural differences (Mach 2010: 248). Having Polish 
citizenship is insignificant in the identification of individuals as ‘us’, because cultural 
closeness decides about social inclusion. 
 
The census of 2002 has facilitated the acceptance of the Law on National and Ethnic 
Minorities and the Regional Language, finally adopted only in 2005, partly due to the EU 
accession (Robotycki 2010: 82). Its main drawback is that the definition of minorities refers 
to the historical terminology from the period of the Commonwealth (see part 2). It prioritises 
historical roots and traditions of minorities and discriminates groups with a relatively short 
history of settlement in Poland. Thus Greeks, for instance, who came to Poland as political 
refugees after 1948 and still comprise a group larger than several other officially recognised 
national groups, do not have  minority status (Pudło 1995; 1997). State legislation is not 
always efficiently implemented at the local level, and raises conflicts over the allocation of 
public funds. Apparently, official statements clash with popular images and social awareness 
of minorities’ presence and rights.  
 
Minority activists criticize the Law on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language 
because during the fifteen years of the process of negotiations, they did not feel they were 
treated like partners in a dialogue, but  paternalistically (Łodziński 2005). They accuse 
authorities of merely fulfilling legal requirements of the EU and not meeting the actual need 
of minorities (Robotycki 2010: 83). Minority leaders pragmatically accept this law, but are 
pessimistic about its daily functioning, also in terms of obtaining financial support. All 
indicate a discrepancy between public discourse and social practices as well as between the 
legal set up and law implementation.  
 
4.3. Tolerance as a value 
 
In most cases, tolerance as a value is addressed in terms of  the above-mentioned assumption 
of a historically shaped Polish propensity to peaceful coexistence with culturally distinct 
groups. References to the ‘golden age of tolerance’ of the Nobles’ Republic (see part 2; also: 
Berenger 2002; Tazbir 1973) are not accompanied by studies on a contemporary 
understanding of tolerance. Quite often, tolerance is discussed in general terms, and as being 
applicable elsewhere (cf. Posern-Zieliński 2004; Borowiak and Szarota 2004). It can be also 
presented as a postulate, a desired value necessary for changing social life. Political and 
media discourses are rather simplistic, probably due to the numeric insignificance of 
minorities in this homogenised population. Everyday interactions with minorities are not 
common and the assimilationist policy of the (post-)communist state has also affected the 
perception of the issue as socially unimportant. 
 
Discourse on tolerance as a value focuses on the theoretical aspects of tolerance and its 
significance in the history in Europe since antiquity. These speculative considerations refer 
chiefly to the Enlightenment thinkers. They focus on philosophical writings and their possible 
applications in social life. Many of them are permeated with ideas put forward by religiously 
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inspired authors or religious authorities (Legutko 1997; Borkowski 2002; Patalon 2008), and 
have virtually no connection to contemporary social life in Poland
36
. 
 
Particularly before 2005, debates on multiculturalism barely existed. They reproduced the 
myth of peaceful coexistence and were mainly descriptive, as there was no particular need for 
debating multicultural policies: 1) national minorities were seen as miniscule and generally 
assimilated; 2) new minorities were not numerous and migrants treated Poland as a transit 
country; 3) the questions of belonging and citizenship were unjustified for those convinced of 
a national homogeneity. Neither the authorities nor the general public showed interest in 
problems related to increasing levels of cultural diversity (Weinar 2008: 3-5).   
 
The discourse on tolerance in a modern sense of the word, i.e. as a concept applicable in 
social policy, is relatively recent in Poland. As such, it is  absent in mainstream education, and 
seen as redundant from the point of view of the majority. One can associate its potential 
growth of importance for the ordinary people and for policy makers only in relation to the 
growing immigration and expanding activism of other social minorities, such as sexual 
minorities or physically challenged people. The increasing number of migrants arriving to 
Poland, according to some experts, simply asks for tolerance towards ethnic and religious 
minorities in the public domain (Patalon 2008; Czerniejewska 2005). 
 
In the 1990s, cultural diversity was again presented by nationalistically minded scholars as a 
threat to the coherent Polish identity. Multicultural ideas were seen as alien concepts, trendy 
but unnecessary and inapplicable locally (Lenik 1994: 48). Similar fears can be found in 
right-wing discourses. They also ridicule ‘political correctness’ and resist ‘indiscriminate 
tolerance’ to any type of cultural distinction. Right-wing discourses are criticised by leftist 
and liberal intellectuals. Thus, public discourses on tolerance often take a bipolar shape: on 
the one hand, minority activists, young left-wing activists and liberal intellectuals speak and 
work for a secular, multicultural and diverse society, and on the other hand, right-wing 
thinkers, nationalist activists and conservative clerical circles fight for national and religious 
integrity and warn against alien cultural imports.  
 
Minority rights in the fields of education and the cultivation of culture, for instance the  
organising of cultural events or preserving traditional crafts, do not raise objections. In this 
respect attitudes are fully tolerant and can probably be connected to the long-lasting 
‘folklorisation’ of diversity present already in the Peoples Republic, and congruent, at least at 
the surface, with multiculturalist ideas. Actual problems appear when: (a) state or EU funding 
for cultural activities is considered; (b) appropriate legislation granting provisions for 
property confiscated by the state after WWII is considered; (c) issues of bilingualism in 
regions populated by minorities (e.g. street names), political representation and 
commemorations of historical events in the public are considered. Tensions arise between 
policy makers at all administrative levels and minority members and representatives 
(Łodziński 2005: 221-223). Poles eagerly accept ‘strangeness’ and ‘otherness’, provided that 
it is practiced in the private sphere or as an exotic custom, i.e. it implies activities that do not 
interfere with their image of the world and do not jeopardize the idea of a homogenous 
community and a sense of security based on cultural familiarity. 
 
                                                     
36
 Discourse on tolerance seems to be the most lively in the area of sexual minorities and non-believers rights. Focus on 
ethnic and religious minorities in the project excludes discussion on issues most pertinent to tolerance in Poland. 
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4.4. Tolerance as a practice 
 
Reports of international organisations monitoring the level of respect for the rights of 
minorities show that the situation of minority groups in Poland is improving, and that racial or 
ethnic offences are rather ‘soft’. Legal standards are increasingly congruent with both the 
social reality and international instruments for equality and anti-discrimination. Despite these 
improvements, data on insufficient state action in many areas concerning support granted to 
culturally distinct groups appear repeatedly, particularly in relation to immigrants (the 
education of children belonging to minority groups; prolonged periods of document issuance, 
difficulties in conducting business and acquiring rights to social assistance). 
 
Poland still lacks in-depth studies on the problem of racial discrimination and ethnically or 
culturally motivated crimes. It is difficult even to define the scale of the phenomenon and to 
specify its manifestations, which is crucial in creating programs and strategies to combat 
them. There is also a visible lack of organisations providing support for victims of such 
practices. This is an area to which attention has not been paid until recently, but it  will be 
increasingly present in Poland, if only because of the increased inflow of foreigners to the 
country (Klaus and Wencel 2009: 43). 
 
Polish law is now better adapted to the EU requirements, but there are still many unregulated 
issues. The only exception is the Labour Code, in which appropriate regulations can be found. 
However, there are many practical problems with its enforcement. In some spheres there are 
no government regulations established, such as the protection of health, or the very question 
of the lack of access to assets and services offered publicly (Bloch and Goździak 2010).  
 
Poland still has not created appropriate anti-discrimination bodies. Although several 
institutions working in this area have been appointed (e.g. the Government Plenipotentiary for 
Equal Treatment, in the appropriate department in the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 
the Ombudsman, the Panel on Racism and Xenophobia the Ministry of Interior), none of them 
(separately or together) meet the requirements derived from EU regulations
37
 (Klaus and 
Wencel 2009: 44). 
 
Concluding this part one can say that there is no visible discrimination against 
culturally/ethnically and religiously different communities in Poland, but there are certainly 
instances of behaviour and opinions conducted in public which require a proper response, 
taking into account respect for the civic rights of all people. 
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 The main criticisms of these institutions relate to the lack of assistance in the formulation of complaints 
concerning culturally motivated violence as well as lack of independent research and expertise in the field of 
discrimination and xenophobia. 
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4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Public opinion polls indicate that the reluctance of Poles towards people of different 
nationalities and ethnic backgrounds residing in Poland is slowly decreasing, which can be 
treated as one of the premises indicating that the tolerance of cultural diversity in Poland is 
growing (CBOS 2010: 9). This is of great importance in the face of the influx of immigrants, 
from Asia to Eastern Europe, among others. 
 
There is an interconnection between openness to ‘others’ and the financial status in the Polish 
socio-cultural conditions – along with the improvement in material status, decreases the 
tendency to intolerant and xenophobic  attitudes, and, therefore, there is a good chance that 
Poland will increase the level of acceptance of difference, if economic performance of the 
country will prosper and thus contribute to a decline in the rates of poverty and 
unemployment  (Jasińska-Kania 2009: 56). 
 
Polish rationale of the cultural diversity debate, residual as it is, has many nationalist, 
xenophobic, and homogenising features (Trapani 2009: 93). However, thanks to liberal, 
anarchist, feminist and non-governmental circles, new elements and forces appear, which 
predicts constant improvements in the situation of minority groups  in Poland, in spite of the 
slow development of the process. 
 
The contemporary debate on tolerance in Poland refers constantly to the mythical tolerance of 
the Nobles’ Republic, resulting in little social conscience on the real problems of minority 
groups and in a reluctance to revise traditional views. This situation is reinforced by the 
relatively low numbers of minority and immigrant populations, together with a still overriding 
importance of the ethnic and cultural component in the common representation of the 
nation/community. 
 
Increasing pluralisation of the Polish society, including increasing visibility of the so-called 
social minority groups (people with disabilities, sexual minorities, etc.) and their struggle to 
gain equal access to universal rights and a place in the public space, is increasingly influential 
in the revival of the debate around the acceptance of diversity and the redefining of notions of 
the homogeneity of the Polish state. Significant achievements in this process are initiated by 
non-governmental organisations representing minority groups because the authorities have no 
special interest in intensifying the dialogue with minority groups, focusing on the introduction 
and implementation of European directives and trying to align with international standards, 
rather than recognising the minorities' actual problems and situation. Nascent debate about 
tolerance and acceptance should be a grassroots attempt to involve minority groups in a 
dialogue with the state. 
 
As the number of culturally distinct citizens within the Polish society increases, it can be  
expected that changes in attitudes towards every-day contact with different cultural practices 
will evolve, thus changes in educational programs and public education campaigns are 
necessary in order to alter the social disposition towards cultural diversity of the majority of 
Poles. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure 1: Main national and ethnic minorities in Poland and immigrant populations 
Minority 
Number 
(declared 
during 
Census of 
2002) 
% of the 
total 
population 
 
% of the 
non-Polish 
population 
 
Status 
Silesian 173 153 0,45 % 37 % 
Minority not recognized 
by the state 
German 152 897 0,39 % 32 % National minority 
Belarussian 48 737 0,13 % 10 % National minority 
Ukrainian 30 957 0,08 % 6,5 % National minority 
Roma 12 855 0,03 % 2,7 % Ethnic minority 
Russian 6 103 0,016 % 1,3 % National minority 
Lemko 5 863 0,015 % 1,2 % Ethnic minority 
Lithuanian 5 846 0,015 % 1,2 % National minority 
Kashubian 5 062 0,013 % 1 % 
Group using regional 
language, not recognized 
by the state as a distinct 
minority 
Slovak 2 001 0,005 % 0,4 % National minority 
Vietnamese 1 808 0,004 % 0,3 % Migrant population 
French 1 633 0,004 % 0,3 % Migrant population 
American 1 541 0,004 % 0,3 % Migrant population 
Greek 1 404 0,003 % 0,2 % Migrant population 
Italian 1 367 0,003 % 0,2 % Migrant population 
Jewish 1 133 0,002 % 0,2 % National minority 
Bulgarian 1 112 0,002 % 0,2 % Migrant population 
Armenian 1 082 0,002 % 0,2 % National minority 
Czech 831 0,002 % 0,1 % National minority 
English 800 0,002 % 0,1 % Migrant population 
Hungarian 579 0,001 % 0,1 % Migrant population 
Dutch 540 0,001 % 0,1 % Migrant population 
Canadian 513 0,001 % 0,1 % Migrant population 
Tartar 495 0,001 % 0,1 % Ethnic minority 
Arab 459 0,001 % 0,1 % Migrant population 
Serbian 442 0,001 % 0,09 % Migrant population 
Austrian 346 0,0009 % 0,07 % Migrant population 
Croat 336 0,0008 % 0,07 % Migrant population 
Romanian 328 0,0008 % 0,06 % Migrant population 
Syrian 312 0,0008 % 0,06 % Migrant population 
Macedonian 286 0,0007 % 0,06 % Migrant population 
…     
Karaim 45 0,0001 % 0,009 % Ethnic minority 
Source: GUS 2002 
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Figure 2: Diversity challenges 
Dimensions of 
difference 
Racial 
Ethnic 
 
Religious Cultural Linguistic 
ETHNIC 
MINORITIES 
     
Roma  X  X X 
Lemko  X X  X 
Tartar  X X   
Karaim  X X   
NATIVE 
MINORITIES 
     
German  X   X 
Belarussian  X X  X 
Ukrainian  X X  X 
Russian  X X  X 
Lithuanian  X   X 
Slovak  X   X 
Jewish  X X  X 
Armenian  X   X 
Czech  X X  X 
Other      
Silesians     X 
Kashubians     X 
IMMIGRANTS      
Vietnamese X X X X X 
Greek  X X X  
Arab X X X X X 
Macedonian  X X X  
  
 
